SECURITY CULTURE 101: How Activists Resist State Repression

We are living in a time of escalating state violence and creeping fascism — where politicians criminalize protest, police brutalize with impunity, and surveillance technology evolves faster than our rights can defend us. From Cop City in Atlanta to Palestine solidarity encampments, activists are being tracked, targeted, and charged not because they’re violent, but because they dare to dissent.

This is not just a political crisis. It’s a crisis of safety, of memory, of collective survival.

If we want our movements to last — if we want to resist not just loudly, but sustainably — we need more than courage. We need security culture.

🔐 1. What Is Security Culture?

Security culture is not just a checklist — it’s a political posture. It’s the quiet muscle of our movements, built from generations of resistance. It’s what we inherit when we study COINTELPRO and the names of those whose lives were unraveled by state surveillance, targeted not because they were doing something wrong — but because they were organizing something right.

At its core, security culture is a collective set of values, habits, and protocols that activists adopt to protect each other from infiltration, surveillance, criminalization, and burnout. It teaches us that discretion is not silence — it’s strategy. That caution is not fear — it’s care in action.

This culture isn’t about paranoia or elitism. It’s about recognizing the reality that who we are — Black, queer, undocumented, poor, trans — makes us more visible to the state. It’s about building the muscle to ask: What do we share? Who needs to know? How do we move smart, not scared? And most importantly: What does it take to keep each other safe while building the world we deserve?

Repression is inevitable, or avoiding it at all costs isn’t worthwhile. Regardless of the struggle, if it’s taken far enough it will become a struggle against the police, those defenders of the world as it is. If we take as a starting point that we will avoid repression at all costs, then we will only use forms of struggle approved of by the police, which makes it pretty much impossible to build collective power capable of transformative change. If we don’t accept these limitations, then we need to be prepared to face repression. [Anarchist Library]

This culture is not solely about secrecy but emphasizes informed caution, mutual trust, and proactive measures to prevent potential threats.

📚 2. Historical Context: Why Security Culture Matters

Security culture isn’t just about tech tools or avoiding surveillance — it’s a living practice grounded in generations of resistance to state repression. Throughout U.S. history, the state has deployed vast resources to infiltrate, surveil, and dismantle social movements — especially those led by Black, Indigenous, immigrant, and radical communities.

1950s–1970s: The Emergence of Security Culture Amidst State Repression

1956–1971: COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence Program)

The FBI initiated COINTELPRO to surveil, infiltrate, and disrupt domestic political organizations. Targets included civil rights groups, anti-war activists, and socialist organizations. Tactics involved wiretapping, spreading misinformation, and fostering internal divisions. The exposure of COINTELPRO in the 1970s highlighted the need for activist communities to develop protective measures against such infiltration.

1969–1977: Weather Underground Organization (WUO)

Originating from the Students for a Democratic Society, the WUO adopted clandestine operations, including bombings of government buildings, to protest U.S. policies. Their underground activities necessitated strict security protocols, such as compartmentalization and the use of aliases, setting precedents for future activist security practices.

1980s–1990s: Institutionalizing Security Practices

1980s: Earth First! and Environmental Activism

The 1980s saw the rise of Earth First!, a radical environmentalist group that challenged corporate destruction of the planet with bold direct action — tree sits, road blockades, and sabotage of logging equipment. As Earth First! gained momentum, it also drew the attention of the state. The FBI and local law enforcement increasingly surveilled, infiltrated, and disrupted the group’s activities using tactics honed during COINTELPRO.

The infiltration of Earth First! wasn’t theoretical — it was real, and it had consequences. One of the most well-known cases involved FBI informant Michael Fain, who penetrated Earth First! circles in Arizona and helped the FBI orchestrate a 1990 sting operation against activists Judi Bari and Darryl Cherney. The pair were injured in a car bombing for which they were wrongfully accused, despite later evidence suggesting state involvement and misconduct. Bari’s activism and later lawsuits revealed a chilling pattern of state repression against environmental activists.

1990s: Anarchist Movements and the Formalization of Security Culture

The 1990s marked a turning point in radical organizing. Across North America and Europe, anarchist movements surged in response to the growing reach of corporate globalization, state militarization, and environmental collapse. From the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle to squatter collectives in major cities, and from forest defense actions to animal liberation, activists were building bold, confrontational movements that directly challenged state and corporate power.

But that visibility came at a cost. These movements quickly became targets of state repression.

Agencies like the FBI, ATF, and local police ramped up infiltration, surveillance, and criminal prosecutions. The use of informants and provocateurs intensified, especially within the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) — both labeled “eco-terrorist threats” by the FBI despite causing no physical harm to people. In cities, anarchist collectives operating housing squats or mutual aid kitchens were routinely harassed, evicted, or monitored. Activists found themselves charged under federal laws meant for organized crime or terrorism.

Key Practices That Emerged or Evolved:

• 🔇 No Discussion of Illegal Activities: Whether in person or online, organizers emphasized the importance of never talking about direct actions, sabotage, or any criminal activity — even after the fact. This was both a legal safeguard and a way to avoid provocateurs fishing for incriminating statements.
• 🔍 Skepticism Toward Newcomers: Rather than assuming everyone shared values, groups increasingly adopted vetting or vouching practices, only inviting people into more sensitive spaces after they’d been introduced by a trusted comrade and observed in action.
• 🤐 Compartmentalization of Information: Affinity groups often practiced need-to-know protocols, ensuring that only those directly involved in an action had access to specific logistical details.
• 🤝 Consensus on Collective Security: Workshops, zines, and anarchist gatherings began promoting the idea that security wasn’t just an individual responsibility — it was a collective one. Poor security habits by one member could endanger the entire group.

2000s–2010s: Adapting to Digital Surveillance

2000s: Rise of Digital Surveillance

As the internet became more integrated into everyday life, the state’s surveillance apparatus grew in sophistication and reach. Activist groups, already wary from COINTELPRO-era tactics, began to recognize that repression was entering a new frontier — one dominated by data, metadata, and algorithmic profiling.

In the early 2000s, the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) gave federal agencies broad powers to conduct electronic surveillance, access personal data without a warrant, and track online behavior under the banner of national security. As a result, digital surveillance became one of the most powerful tools in the state’s arsenal. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies began using spyware, stingray devices (to mimic cell towers), and open-source intelligence tools (OSINT) to monitor political dissent and protest organizing.

2011: Occupy Wall Street Movement

The Occupy Wall Street movement, which began in September 2011, represented a massive wave of decentralized, social-media-driven activism. Protesters gathered in Zuccotti Park in New York City and in public spaces across the globe to challenge economic inequality and the power of financial institutions. But the movement’s reliance on livestreaming, Facebook groups, Twitter hashtags, and mass texts made it uniquely vulnerable to state surveillance.

Federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinated with local law enforcement and private security contractors to monitor Occupy protesters across dozens of cities. Fusion Centers — information-sharing hubs connecting federal and local agencies — played a key role in gathering intelligence from social media and coordinating crackdown efforts.

2020s: Contemporary Challenges and the Evolution of Security Culture

2020: George Floyd Protests and Increased Surveillance

In the summer of 2020, following the police murder of George Floyd, one of the largest protest movements in U.S. history erupted — spanning all 50 states and dozens of countries. While the scale and speed of organizing were unprecedented, so too was the visibility of state surveillance tactics.

Across the country, protesters were subjected to a wide array of both overt and covert surveillance:

• Facial recognition tools, such as Clearview AI, were used by police departments to identify and track demonstrators.
• Geofence warrants allowed authorities to demand location data from smartphones in specific areas during protest hours.
• Social media accounts were scraped by fusion centers and local police for posts, images, and live footage that could later be used in legal proceedings.
• Surveillance drones — such as those used by Customs and Border Protection — flew over Minneapolis and other cities to monitor crowd movements.
• Protesters were tracked via license plate readers, stingray devices, and surveillance helicopters.

2021–Present: Ongoing Adaptations

As protest waves gave way to legislative backlash, criminal charges, and political repression, activist communities began to deepen and institutionalize security practices:

• The Stop Cop City movement in Atlanta revealed just how aggressively the state could move — from installing unmarked surveillance cameras in activist neighborhoods to charging 61 protesters with RICO (racketeering) — a law traditionally used to target organized crime.
• Organizers fighting anti-trans laws, defending abortion access, or working with undocumented communities increasingly rely on intersectional threat modeling, acknowledging that identity (race, gender, immigration status) shapes both risk and state response.
• Digital repression — including doxxing, account bans, and shadowbanning — forced creators and educators to diversify platforms and backup their work.
• Security culture zines, digital toolkits, and peer trainings are now commonplace across community groups, mutual aid networks, and affinity spaces.

These histories remind us: the state doesn’t just react to violence — it reacts to liberation. Security culture is a defense strategy that protects organizers and helps movements survive.

🧭 3. Core Values of Security Culture

Security culture is grounded in several key principles that guide its implementation:

Collective Responsibility: Ensuring the safety of a movement is a shared duty. Every member must be vigilant and uphold security protocols to protect the group as a whole.

Informed Caution: Being aware of potential threats and taking proactive steps to mitigate them without succumbing to paranoia.

Trust and Verification: Building relationships based on trust, while also verifying information and sources to prevent infiltration or misinformation.

Respect for Privacy: Recognizing and upholding the privacy of individuals within the movement, understanding that personal information can be exploited if mishandled.

Another point is to privilege face-to-face meetings. Regardless of the platform or how secure or insecure it is, we build better trust, stronger relationships, and come to better decisions when we take the time to meet in person. When electronic means of communication replace the face-to-face, our conversations are easier to surveil, misunderstandings come up more often, and they can be disrupted by decisions or problems at far-away companies. For all the uses of electronic communication in your organizing, ask yourself if it’s replacing face-to-face meetings, and if it is, ask if it really needs to. Consider reducing your reliance on these things and begin trying to shift more conversations back to in person. (More on tech stuff in a bit… [Anarchist Library]

Adaptability: Being prepared to adjust strategies and practices in response to evolving threats or new information.

🛠️ 4. Implementing Security Culture: Everyday Practices That Protect Our Movements

Security culture is more than just using encrypted apps or hiding your identity — it’s a collective mindset that guides how we organize, communicate, and protect each other from repression. When movements are surveilled, infiltrated, or targeted by the state, adopting security practices becomes not just a precaution but a necessity. Implementing security culture means developing protocols tailored to your specific group's risks.

Here are the core areas to focus on according to What Is Security Culture? from Anarchist Library:

Don’t ask, don’t tell.

Don’t ask others to share confidential information you don’t need to know. Don’t brag about illegal things you or others have done, or mention things that are going to happen or might happen, or even refer to another person’s interest in being involved in such activities. Stay aware whenever you speak; don’t let chance allusions drop out thoughtlessly.

You can say no at any time to anyone about anything.

Don’t answer any questions you don’t want to — not just with police officers, but also with other activists and even close friends: if there’s something you don’t feel safe sharing, don’t. This also means being comfortable with others not answering questions: if there’s a conversation they want to keep to themselves, or they ask you not to be part of a meeting or project, you shouldn’t take this personally — it’s for everyone’s good that they’re free to do so. Likewise, don’t participate in any projects you don’t feel good about, or collaborate with anyone you feel ill at ease with, or ignore your gut feeling in any situation; if something goes wrong and you get into trouble, you don’t want to have any regrets. You’re responsible for not letting anyone talk you into taking risks you’re not ready for.

Don’t ever turn your friends over to your enemies.

If captured, never, ever give up any information that could endanger anyone else. Some recommend an explicit oath be sworn by all participants in a direct action group: that way, in a worst-case scenario, when pressure might make it hard to distinguish between giving up a few harmless details and totally selling out, everyone will know exactly what commitments they made to each other.

Don’t be too predictable in the methods you employ, or the targets you choose, or the times and places you meet to discuss things.

Don’t be too visible in the public aspects of the struggle in which you do your most serious direct action: keep your name off mailing lists and out of the media, perhaps avoid association with aboveground organizations and campaigns entirely. If you’re involved in really serious clandestine activities with a few comrades, you may want to limit your interactions in public, if not avoid each other altogether. Federal agents can easily get access to the phone numbers dialed from your phone, and will use such lists to establish connections between individuals; the same goes for your email, and the books you check out from libraries, and especially social networking sites like Myspace.

Don’t leave a trail: credit card use, gas cards, cell phone calls all leave a record of your motions, purchases, and contacts.

Have a cover story, supported by verifiable facts, if you might need one. Be careful about what your trash could reveal about you — dropouts aren’t the only ones who go dumpstering! Keep track of every written document and incriminating photocopy — keep them all in one place, so you can’t accidentally forget one — and destroy them as soon as you don’t need them. The fewer there are in the first place, the better; get used to using your memory. Make sure there aren’t any ghosts of such writing left behind in impressions on the surfaces you were writing on, whether these be wooden desks or pads of paper. Assume that every use of computers leaves a trail, too.

Don’t throw any direct action ideas around in public that you think you might want to try at some point.

Wait to propose an idea until you can gather a group of individuals that you expect will all be interested in trying it; the exception is the bosom companion with whom you brainstorm and hash out details in advance — safely outside your home and away from mixed company, of course. Don’t propose your idea until you think the time is right for it to be tried. Invite only those you are pretty certain will want to join in — everyone you invite who doesn’t end up participating is a needless security risk, and this can be doubly problematic if it turns out they feel your proposed activity is laughably dumb or morally wrong. Only invite people who can keep secrets — this is critical whether or not they decide to participate.

Develop a private shorthand for communicating with your comrades in public.

It’s important to work out a way to communicate surreptitiously with your trusted friends about security issues and comfort levels while in public situations, such as at a meeting called to discuss possible direct action. Knowing how to gauge each other’s feelings without others being able to tell that you are sending messages back and forth will save you the headache of trying to guess each other’s thoughts about a situation or individual, and help you avoid acting strangely when you can’t take your friend aside in the middle of things to compare notes. By the time you have convened a larger group to propose an action plan, you and your friends should be clear on what each other’s intentions, willingness to run risks, levels of commitment, and opinions of others are, to save time and avoid unnecessary ambiguity. If you haven’t been part of a direct action planning circle before, you’ll be surprised how complicated and convoluted things can get even when everyone does arrive prepared.

Resources on Security Culture…

📘 Security Culture: A Handbook for Activists: https://mutualaiddisasterreliefsite.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/security-culture-a-handbook-for-activists.pdf

🔍 Threat Modeling for Activists — Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Understand how to assess your risks and build digital security practices that match your reality. https://ssd.eff.org/

🕵🏽 CrimethInc’s Security Culture Primer https://crimethinc.com/2004/11/01/what-is-security-culture

🛡️ Riseup: Digital Tools & Privacy for Organizers: https://riseup.net/en/security

📘 A Bridge Too Far: An article on how federal agents infiltrate and entrap radicals: https://clevelandmagazine.com/in-the-cle/the-read/articles/a-bridge-too-far

EFF — Threat Modeling 101: https://ssd.eff.org/module/your-security-plan

📽️ Case Studies & Historical Context

COINTELPRO 101 (Free Documentary) | Overview of the FBI’s covert campaign to infiltrate and destroy liberation movements.

🔗 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0_DqtKVWIs

Rolling Stone — The Cleveland 5 Case | Analyzes FBI tactics of coercion and entrapment and their long history of targeting leftists.

🔗 https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-plot-against-occupy-187832/